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Just as medical science devel-
oped the vaccines and drugs
believed necessary to con-
quer infectious diseases such as
smallpox, polio, measles, tuber-
culosis, whooping cough, and
diphtheria, a new generation of
risks to public health is emerg-
ing. Previously unknown infec-
tions such as the Ebola virus,
HIV/AIDS, Lyme and
Legionnaire's diseases, and dead-
ly new strains of E. coli and
Staphylococcus bacteria threaten
public health worldwide. In
addition, resistance to antibiotics
is reachingepidemic proportions
according to some scientists, and
anthrax spores and botulism
toxin have been produced and
stockpiledfor use aspossible bio-
logicalwarfareagents.
In the face ofthese biologi-
cal threats, scientists, the public,
public health officials, policy mak-
ers, and governments are seeking
answers to the questions ofhow to predict
the spread ofemerging infectious diseases
and how to protect against their effects. In
assessing the risk ofbiological agents, deci-
sions will need to be made as to which of
these threats to public health are most
WhatType ofRisk?
The processes employed by sci-
entists to assess and quantify
risks differ depending on
whether the threat is a chemical
urgent, how to distribute funds for control
and research, and how to provide advice,
set public health priorities, and design
interventions to deal with the newest ver-
sions ofthe oldest environmental hazards.
or physical hazard or a biological
agent. Epidemiology, the study
ofthe distribution and dynamics
ofdiseases through human pop-
ulations, provides a scientific
basis for the evaluation of risk
from biological agents. Most
epidemics of infectious disease
are characterized by acute symp-
toms that appear after relatively
short incubation periods and can
be reliably diagnosed from dini-
cal signs and laboratory tests.
Infectious disease epidemiolo-
gists can determine "attack
rates," or the relative infectious-
ness and survival rates for infec-
tious diseases. From these and
other data, including the avail-
ability and effectiveness of treat-
ments, they can also ascertain the severi-
ty of risk from uncontrolled disease out-
breaks as compared to other infectious dis-
eases. Epidemiologists also use mortality
rates or incidence ofsevere disabilities to
calculate "years of potential life lost" or
"'years ofpotential productivity lost" from
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debilitating infectious diseases such as
maternal rubella infection or polio. Such
estimates are used to support recommenda-
tions for funding of prevention programs
for infectious diseases and other public
health problems.
Although epidemiology is also a valu-
able discipline in helping to characterize
risks from long-term, chronic exposures to
environmental chemical and physical haz-
ards, there are fundamental differences
between these exposures and effects and
those associated with biological agents.
Environmental chemical exposures are
most often associated with chronic diseases
with long incubation periods, and multiple
etiologies. Their effects are not easily diag-
nosed in the early stages by either physical
examination or laboratory studies. The
risks to human health from hazardous
chemical exposures often must be weighed
against the benefits of economic and
industrial development and an abundant
food supply. Balancing risks with benefits
implies the ability to accurately measure
risks. If these risks are unacceptably high,
regulations implementing engineering and
other controls are enacted to manage them.
Unlike most chemical hazards, disease-
causing biological agents are generally
viewed as naturally occurring entities with
no associated benefit.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
public concern about environmental chem-
icals and radiation increased and worries
about infectious disease declined. Federal
agencies were created and given broad reg-
ulatory responsibilities for environmental,
occupational, and consumer product safe-
ty. These agencies adopted a process called
risk assessment to identify and quantify the
health risks from exposures to chemical
and physical agents. In March 1983, the
National Academy of Sciences' National
Research Council (NRC) published Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process. The study was com-
missioned by Congress to assist federal reg-
ulatory agencies in strengthening the relia-
bility and objectivity of scientific assess-
ments that provide a basis for regulatory
policies applicable to chemical carcinogens
and other nonbiological public health haz-
ards. The report defined quantitative risk
assessment as a four-step process:
* Hazard identification-the determina-
tion ofwhether a particular chemical is
or is not causally liked to particular
health effects;
* Dose-response assessment-the deter-
mination of the relationship between
the magnitude of exposure and the
probability of occurrence of the health
effect in question;
* Exposure assessment-the determina-
tion of the extent of human exposure
before or after the application of regu-
latory controls;
* Risk characterization-the description
of the nature and often the magnitude
of human risk, including attendant
uncertainty.
The NRC report validated the fundamen-
tal principles of quantitative risk assess-
ment used by federal regulatory agencies
for environmental and occupational haz-
ards, and risk assessment has become the
fundamental tool used by environmental
public health experts to estimate the mag-
nitude of the threat to public health from
chemical and physical hazards.
Biological RiskAssessment
Assessing the risk to human health from
biological agents has taken a separate
course. While federal research funding for
cancers and other chronic diseases with
presumed environmental etiologies
increased, infectious and communicable
disease programs and research have not
fared as well. According to some critics,
policy makers have assumed that modern
vaccines, good sanitation, and food safety
would continue to reduce the incidence of
communicable diseases. To a limited
extent, this optimism has been warranted,
but it has failed to anticipate either the
ability of biological agents to evade the
armaments of modern medicine or the
emergence of new, virulent infections that
defy the best ofmodern medicine.
In 1973, smallpox virus escaped from a
laboratory in London, causing widespread
public alarm and initiating international
efforts to assure that infectious agents in
laboratories and research institutions are
regulated and controlled. In the United
States, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) developed guidelines
for laboratory safety that include four lev-
els of containment of human pathogens
based on the magnitude of the risk of the
agent to human health ifreleased:
* Level 1-no or very low individual
and community risk. The microorgan-
ism is unlikely to cause human or ani-
mal disease;
* Level 2-moderate individual risk and
low community risk. The pathogen
can cause human or animal disease
but is unlikely to be a serious hazard
to laboratory workers, the communi-
ty, livestock, or the environment.
Laboratory-acquired exposures may
cause serious infection, but effective
treatment and preventive measures are
available and the risk of spread of
infection is limited;
* Level 3-high individual risk and low
community risk. The pathogen usually
causes serious human or animal disease
but does not ordinarily spread from
one infected individual to another.
Effective treatment and preventive
measures are available;
* Level 4-high individual risk and com-
munity risk. The pathogen usually caus-
es serious human or animal disease and
can be readily transmitted from one
individual to another, directly or indi-
rectly. Effective treatment and preven-
tive measures are not usuallyavailable.
Under prevailing World Health
Organization (WHO) convention, each
member nation assigns biological agents to
one ofthese categories based on such vari-
ables as pathogenicity, modes of transmis-
sion, levels ofimmunity in the local popu-
lation, presence and control ofvectors, and
availability of preventive and therapeutic
measures. In the United States, the CDC
makes these determinations. The scientific
process for classifying well-characterized
pathogens such as smallpox is rather
straightforward. But for emerging infec-
tious diseases where data are limited, deci-
sions must be based on preliminary epi-
demiological data, modeling, and a public
health tradition that dictates the most con-
servative approach to unknown risks.
HIV/AIDS is one of the emerging
infectious diseases for which policy makers
and the public demanded estimates ofrisk to
public health when very little data were
available. According to Philip Cooley, a sta-
tistician and survey research expert at
Research Triangle Institute in Research
Triangle Park, North Carolina, once the
retrovirus that causes AIDS had been identi-
fied and characterized, "Our priority was to
model the spread of the infection so that
public health officials could reliablypublicize
the risks of disease from various sexual
and/or drug use behaviors." He adds, "These
models were also critical to epidemiologists
in making estimates of the spread of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in high-risk popula-
tions." The earliest HIV/AIDS risk models
were based heavily on assumptions, and like
the earliest assessments of chemical risks,
they suffered from limited data characteriz-
ing the hazard or delineating the routes of
exposure and dose response. However, as sci-
entists tested the assumptions and as research
provided more data, the models have
became more accurate predictors. According
to Cooley, the major value ofmodeling the
spread of an emerging infectious disease
through the population is in developing con-
trol strategies for emerging infectious dis-
eases. Forexample, in the 26July 1996 issue
of Science, Sally Blower, a researcher in the
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department ofbiostatistics andepidemiology
at the University of California at San
Francisco, presents a theoretical framework
for an eradication strategy for tuberculosis
(TB) in developed and emerging nations.
Blower modeled the transmission ofTB in
patients and derived estimates ofthe mini-
mum treatment levels ofpatients and their
contacts needed to eradicate TB. Cooley
notes that "Blower has assimilated much of
the seminal work in modeling the spread of
infectious disease epidemics into a practical
setofrecommendations to thecontrol ofthe
worldwide tuberculosis epidemic." However,
critics chargethatwhilesuch models provide
health officials with the elements to poten-
tially reduce disease rates and control epi-
demics, theydo not offercomparative quan-
tifications of the magnitude of risks from
biological agents.
Pathogens are selected as potential bio-
logicalwarfareand terrorism agents based on
their high probability ofcausing a very high
incidence ofdeath or severe incapacitation.
Ifsuch agents were used, scientists predict
that thevictimswouldoverwhelm thehealth
care delivery system and traditional public
health interventions forprotectingthegener-
alpopulation. This reality is addressed in the
August 1997 issue of the Journal ofthe
American Medical Association, which is
devoted entirely to the threat ofbiological
warfare and biological terrorism. David
Franz, a veterinary pathologist at the U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases at Ft. Detrick, Maryland,
andleadauthorofthesurveyarticle on dini-
cal recognition and management, induded
estimates prepared by the WHO in 1970
that, for example, 50 kg ofBacillus anthracis
dispensed from an aircraft 20 km upwind of
acityof500,000 wouldkill 220,000 people.
Franz's paper provides information on
recognition, diagnosis, and treatment ofthe
diseases caused by the pathogens most likely
to be used by terrorists. Franz argues for a
system ofsurveillancebyphysicians educated
to recognize and report diseases caused by
bioterrorism agents. The system would alert
health officials quickly so that appropriate
therapy could be initiated and the impact of
a terrorist attack gready reduced. He advo-
cates education of all private physicians in
the diagnosis and treatment of diseases
caused by biological warfare and bioterror-
ism agents. But these measures have not yet
taken place, in part because such programs
would be expensive and present significant
logistical difficulties. Measures such as creat-
ing a national surveillance system, manufac-
turing, stockpiling, andproperlystoringvac-
cines, and putting a vaccine delivery system
in place to immediately immunize thou-
sands ofcitizens facesimilarchallenges.
TakingMeasures
The federal Anti-Terrorism Act authorized
the CDC to issue risk-based regulations con-
trolling the transfer and use of hazardous
agents in the United States with the goal of
preventing access for use in domestic or
international terrorism. The CDC issued
regulations in April 1997 that identified 24
infectious agents and 12 toxins that pose a
significant risk to public health. These bio-
logical agents were selected based on the
threat posed to human health from expo-
sure, the contagiousness of the agent, the
ease ofmethods bywhich the agent is trans-
mitted through the population, and the
availability and effectiveness of immuniza-
tion and treatment. Both Franz and CDC
experts point out that surveillance by physi-
cians educated to recognize and report dis-
eases caused by these restricted biological
agents would alert health officials quickly so
that appropriate therapy could be initiated
and the impact ofa terrorist attack gready
reduced.
Arnold Kauflnann, a medical epidemi-
ologist recendy retired from the CDC, and
Martin Meltzer, a CDC health economist,
writing in the April-June 1997 issue ofthe
JournalofEmergingInfectious Diseases, mod-
eled the impact ofa terrorist attack using B.
anthracisand estimated risks as measured by
the economic costs. They reported a cost of
$26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed.
They argue that the nation cannot afford to
not develop a system of surveillance, and
establish a program to assure rapid, post-
attackprophylaxis. Using an economicargu-
ment for interventions to protect human
health from the risks ofbiological agents is a
step towardharmonization ofthe differences
between risk assessments for chemical and
biological hazards. Another example ofthe
convergenceoftheapproaches to theseprob-
lems and the scientific methods to assess risk
can be found in recent proposals to improve
foodsafety.
The World Trade Organization adopted
the International Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures to give guidance to countries in
developing consistent regulations to control
the food-borne human and plant pathogens
that may be imported on foods. Under the
international covenant, these regulations
mustbe risk-based. AnnaLammerding, chief
of microbial food safety risk assessment for
Health and Welfare Canada, proposes using
the four-step process used in quantitative
risk assessment for environmental chemicals
as a `newstrategyfor evaluating andmanag-
ing food safety risks that arise from changes
in pathogens, food preparation, distribution,
consumption, and population immunity
that have the potential to adversely affect
human health." Nell Ahl, director of the
U.S. Department ofAgriculture's (USDA)
Office ofRisk Assessment and Cost Benefit
Analysis, compares and contrasts toxicologi-
cal and chemical risk assessments developed
over the past 30 years with the procedures
usedto assess risksfromimportedplantpests
and livestock diseases, as well as food safety
for human health. Ahl says, "Biological risk
assessments present great challenges because
ofthe variability ofindividual pathogens as
well as [the fact that] the variability ofindi-
viduals affected by these pathogens adds
anotherlevel ofcomplexity." She adds, "The
USDAuses scenario orpathwayanalysis and
probabilistic methods to trace the hazard
from the initiating event to the occurrence
of the hazard, making use of probability
density functions to express what is known
andwhat is not known about the movement
of the hazard through the pathway." The
USDA has not yet formally adopted these
procedures, nor have they become the stan-
dardforjustifying theregulations controlling
the import ofhuman and plant pathogens
on foods and other agricultural products
into the United States. Ahl wants to be sure
that the four-step process delineated in the
NRC report can be adapted in a scientifical-
ly rigorous manner for biological purposes.
Lammerding is quite optimistic that the
quantitative risk-assessment model forchem-
ical hazards can be adapted. She andher col-
leagues are using it as the general approach
to assessing risks from food-borne
pathogens.
The 1983 NRC report concluded,
"Dissatisfaction with the actions offederal
regulatoryagencies isoften expressed as criti-
cism ofthe conduct and administration of
the risk assessment process. The committee
believes that the basic problem in risk assess-
ment is the sparseness and uncertaintyofthe
scientific knowledge of the health hazard
addressed, and this problem has no ready
solution. The field has been developing
rapidly and the greatest improvements in
risk assessment result from acquisition of
more and better data, which decreases the
need to relyoninferenceandinformedjudg-
ment." Clearly this statement is true today
for both chemical and biological risk assess-
ments. In particular, as recognition grows
that both oldand newinfectious agents con-
tinue to threaten public health, assessing
these risks is dependenton aggressive pursuit
ofscientificknowledgeandarationalprocess
to use this knowledge to quantitate these
risks and to design effectiveinterventions.
Dan C.VanderMeer
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